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Abstract 
In this article, the stability of the equilibria against perturbations on co-evolutionary megalopolis communities’ networks was studied and 
a number of new features were found. Power law distributions of the differences of the cooperative communities’ number after and before 
perturbations are observed with power exponents changed for different intensities of temptation to defection.  
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1. Introduction 
Megalopolis is composed of a large number of communities with simple interactions giving rise to complex global 
structures and dynamics. The theory of evolutionary games provides a suitable framework for modeling communities’ 
interactions whereas spatial structures have to be taken into account to tackle the essence of co-evolutionary dynamics of 
real megalopolis. A simple model system is given by Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) game with co-evolutionary dynamics. The 
PD game is probably the most prominent example of a basic model for explaining the emergence of cooperative behavior in 
social communities and other complex systems [1-4]. In the PD game communities, who are either cooperative, C , or 
defective, D , act according to their strategies whenever two of them interact. If both communities choose C , both get a 
payoff R ; if both choose D , both get P ; if one defective while the other cooperative, D  gets T , while C  gets S , 
where SPRT !!! . Here, we adopt the values 1 R , 1! bT , 0  PS . Parameter b  characterizes the 
temptation to defection against cooperation. The properties of the PD game defined on complex networks exhibit a strong 
dependence on the static topology[5,6], and recently there are some works studying the interplay of dynamic games and 
topological structures[7-9]. Remarkably, the interplay of game dynamics and topology can drive the network to self-
organized states that cannot be inferred by studying the dynamical processes on static networks. 
One essential property of evolutionary games is given by the equilibria or the evolutionary stable states. All stationary 
states of the game are Nash equilibria [1]. An interesting question is the stability of these equilibria against perturbations, 
and this problem has been investigated in static networks [6]. How about the avalanche dynamics of the states under the 
interplay of PD game dynamics and topology? It is a new, fundamental and almost unexplored problem. This is the central 
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task to study the avalanche dynamics of megalopolis communities’ networks under slight perturbations by considering co-
evolutionary dynamics. 
2. Model 
The avalanche dynamics of megalopolis communities’ networks is studied on the basis of the network structure proposed 
in our previous work [7]. The main feature of the model is that the network has both fixed local links and adjustable long-
range links. In the network, all nodes, representing communities in the game, are distributed in a two-dimensional lattice. 
All communities have nearest-neighbor interactions by n  local links without direction ( 2,3,4 n  for internal, edge and 
corner nodes, respectively). These local interactions are assumed to be fixed during the whole process of the game. On the 
other hand, all communities have limited needing to establish long-range links (for simplicity, we take a single long-range 
links for every communities). All long-range links are directed by arrows. For a given node a long-range links is called 
active if the arrow is from the node while passive if the arrow is toward the node. In the network, nodes play PD game with 
all nodes connected (including all nearest neighbors, one active long-range link’s neighbor and all passive long-range links’ 
neighbors), following the role: learning from the best to adjust their strategies and long-range links. Each communities (say 
A) compares the payoff of himself with those of all his connected neighbors in the previous round and finds out the 
community with the best payoff (or chooses one with equal probabilities if there are multiple best neighbors). If A has the 
largest payoff, A keeps its own previous strategy and long-range link; otherwise, A learns from the best neighbor (say B) by 
simultaneously taking the same strategy of B and rewiring its active long-range link to B’s active long-range link neighbor 
(if the new long-range link does not achieve more profit, keeps the old links) with probability )1/(1 PeW ' E , where 
P' denotes the remainder to take the community’s total payoff from its best neighbor’s, and E  characterizes the noise 
effects (here, we choose 1.0 E  for numerical simulations). In this work, we will study the influences of perturbations on 
the steady states and the characteristic behaviors of avalanches induced by the perturbations. 
3. Numerical simulation 
We will study the dynamics of avalanches as follows. After the co-evolutionary megalopolis communities’ network has 
reached a stationary state, and adverse strategy is assigned to a community randomly chosen. The insertion of a new 
strategy offers new opportunities for learning to the perturbed community itself and to its nearest neighbors and again 
neighbors of the nearest neighbors and so on. A perturbation can thus lead to an avalanche of strategy and interaction 
changes until a new stationary state is reached again. We defined a quantity to characterize the avalanche dynamics, which 
is CN' , the difference between the numbers of cooperators after and before the perturbation. All simulations results for 
different b ’s are taken from 2000 different realizations of initial linking and strategy conditions. We observe distinct 
regimes of the avalanche dynamics, depending on the control parameter b . 
For weak-temptation, 2.11  b , critical behavior occurs, i.e., the probability distributions of cooperator change 
)( CNP '  show clearly power laws of D'v' CC NNP )(  with scaling exponent 10.042.2 r D  (see Fig. 1). In 
this region, small perturbations lead only to small avalanches which are necessary to reestablish stationary equilibria. 
     
Fig. 1. Probability distribution )( CNP '  for weak temptation. Open squares show numerical data. The black line shows fitting line of these data. 
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The avalanche behaviors for large b become much more complex as well as interesting. First, for 2.1tb , one can
observe power law distribution of )( CNP '  while with different power exponents D'v' CC NNP )( . In Fig. 
find 3|D  in a large of b , but 2|D  (see Fig. 2) for certain particular b  values. The difference of the scaling expD  may be due to the transitions of the asymptotic network structures. In [7] we found that the stable model’s stru
change from single-scale to broad-scale, from broad-scale to scale-free, and from scale-free to all-defector states a
0.2 b , 5.2 b , and 0.2 b  respectively, and these may be the reasons why we observe 2|D  at these particu
values, sharply different from 3|D  in a vide regions of 2.1tb . 
 
Fig. 2. Probability distribution )( CNP '  for 2.1tb . Open squares show numerical data. 
For a comparison, we study also the avalanche dynamics of the static megalopolis communities’ network (the netw
exactly the same as our model except all long-range links fixed or static). In Fig. 3 we show the results. For 2.1b
probability distributions )( CNP '  follow also power laws FCC NNP D'v' )(  with different scaling expo
10.086.1 r FD . The exponents of static network are smaller than that of co-evolutionary network, becaus
adjustable long-range links can help to establish effectively new balance after the perturbation, and thus finish the aval
processes in much fewer steps. For 2.1tb , we can no longer observe same behaviors in static network as co-evoluti
network. In static network, cooperators form clusters owing to the random long-range links when b  is large, and 
cooperator clusters are separated by defectors and the percentage of cooperators is lower than its in co-evoluti
networks. In static networks, when the perturbation happened in the inner of defector-sea the perturbation disapp
rapidly. On the contrary, if the perturbation happened in the boundary of defector-sea and cooperator clusters or happen
the inner of cooperator clusters, the perturbation will be transported through small cooperator clusters and the thin “cha
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of the defector-sea. Though the perturbation can be transported in large-scale in static networks, the effect of it is li
owing to the fixed long-range links. 
  
Fig. 3. Probability distribution )( CNP '  for fixed megalopolis communities’ networks. 
4. Conclusion 
In conclusion, we have studied the avalanche dynamics of the co-evolutionary megalopolis communities’ networ
the PD game law and learning from the best interactions. Rich phenomena can be observed in the avalanche dynamic
particular, we find by numerical simulations that the probability distribution of the average absolute change of the nu
of cooperators before and after random perturbations shows power law with different scaling exponents for dif
intensities of temptation to defect. These interesting phenomena do not exist in static megalopolis communities’ netw
and the diversity of avalanches dynamics in the co-evolutionary networks may come from the interactions bet
communities capable to adjust their long-range links owing to the learning ability. Our results represent a first step in
unexplored domain of the properties with generic self-organized coupling between dynamics and topology of com
networks. We will go further in the future to explore new features in these co-evolution processes and to understan
mechanisms underlying these features. 
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